This insightful two-volume set presents a careful selection of the most important published papers on the economics of antitrust law. The collection focuses on areas of major importance including market power, horizontal arrangements, and vertical arrangements and exclusionary behaviour. It includes seminal papers on topics such as oligopoly and collusion, horizontal mergers and joint ventures, exclusive dealing and tying and bundling.
The Economics of Antitrust Law will be an essential source of reference for economists, lawyers and practitioners concerned with this important and controversial area of law and economics.
This insightful two-volume set presents a careful selection of the most important published papers on the economics of antitrust law. The collection focuses on areas of major importance including market power, horizontal arrangements, and vertical arrangements and exclusionary behaviour. It includes seminal papers on topics such as oligopoly and collusion, horizontal mergers and joint ventures, exclusive dealing and tying and bundling.
The Economics of Antitrust Law will be an essential source of reference for economists, lawyers and practitioners concerned with this important and controversial area of law and economics.
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction The Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust
Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner
PART I MARKET POWER
1. Harold Demsetz (1973), ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and
Public Policy’
2. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘Market Power in
Antitrust Cases’
3. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), ‘On the Misuse of
Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits’
4. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande and Steven C. Salop
(1987), ‘Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law’
5. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1992), ‘Empirical
Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power’
6. Benjamin Klein (1993), ‘Market Power in Antitrust: Economic
Analysis after Kodak’
PART II HORIZONTAL ARRANGEMENTS
A Oligopoly and Collusion
7. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’
8. Donald F. Turner (1962), ‘The Definition of Agreement under the
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal’
9. Richard A. Posner (1969), ‘Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A
Suggested Approach’
10. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A
Noncooperative View’
11. Jonathan B. Baker (1993), ‘Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas:
Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic
Theory’
B Horizontal Mergers and Joint Ventures
12. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust
Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’
13. Janusz Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1983), ‘The 1982
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic
Assessment’
14. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), ‘Horizontal Mergers: An
Equilibrium Analysis’
15. Jonathan B. Baker (2002), ‘Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion:
Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust
Laws’
16. Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece (1990), ‘Innovation and
Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust’
17. Carl Shapiro and Robert D. Willig (1990), ‘On the Antitrust
Treatment of Production Joint Ventures’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
Introduction The Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust
Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner
PART I VERTICAL ARRANGEMENTS
1. Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi (1956), ‘Law and the Future:
Trade Regulation’
2. Frank H. Easterbrook (1984), ‘The Limits of Antitrust’
A Tying and Bundling
3. Ward S. Bowman, Jr. (1957), ‘Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem’
4. George J. Stigler (1963), ‘United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note
of Block-Booking’
5. William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen (1976), ‘Commodity
Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly’
6. Benjamin Klein and Lester F. Saft (1985), ‘The Law and Economics
of Franchise Tying Contracts’
7. Michael D. Whinston (1990), ‘Tying, Foreclosure, and
Exclusion’
8. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use
of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving
Industries’
9. Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’
B Resale Price Maintenance and Exclusive Territories
10. Lester G. Telser (1960), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair
Trade?’
11. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints
as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’
12. Pauline M. Ippolito (1991), ‘Resale Price Maintenance:
Empirical Evidence From Litigation’
C Exclusive Dealing
13. Howard P. Marvel (1982), ‘Exclusive Dealing’
14. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a
Barrier to Entry’
15. Eric Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991),
‘Naked Exclusion’
16. Benjamin Klein and Andres Lerner (2007), ‘The Expanded
Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents
Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty’
PART II UNILATERAL EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR
A Predatory Pricing
17. John S. McGee (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard
Oil (N.J.) Case’
18. Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner (1975), ‘Predatory Pricing
and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’
19. Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1981), ‘An Economic
Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation’
B Raising Rivals’ Costs
20. Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop (1986),
‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power
Over Price’
21. Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein (1996), ‘Monopolization by
“Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case’
Name Index
Edited by Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner, Compass Lexecon, Los Angeles, US
'A well collected, historically sensitive, and highly useful selection of the most important essays on the uses of economics in antitrust law. Klein and Lerner include a superb introduction explaining the development of and rationales for an economic approach to antitrust.'- Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Iowa, US
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