In the early 1950s, the frail septuagenarian Iranian prime minister shook the world, challenging superpower Britain by nationalizing the British-run oil industries in Iran. His name was Doctor Mohammad Mosaddeq. His subsequent downfall in August 1953 changed the course of Iranian history, and remains a haunting memory for the people of Iran today. The British and American governments collaborated in a plot to remove Mosaddeq but which nonetheless failed to ignite. However, days afterwards, amid violent street disturbances, Mosaddeq's government did indeed fall. So, for half a century the conventional wisdom attributed the events of 19th August 1953 to foul play by the CIA and a myth of CIA power and success was created that has mesmerized opinion ever since and cast a shadow over Iran's continuingly troubled relations with America. This pathbreaking study unearths new documentary evidence to suggest the truth lies elsewhere and that Mosaddeq's fall actually took Washington and London by complete surprise. The author provides compelling evidence to suggest that the toppling of Mosaddeq was rooted primarily in internal Iranian dynamics and that prominent clerics of the time, notably the grand Shiite Marja of the time, Ayatollah Boroujerdi, played a crucial role.
In the early 1950s, the frail septuagenarian Iranian prime minister shook the world, challenging superpower Britain by nationalizing the British-run oil industries in Iran. His name was Doctor Mohammad Mosaddeq. His subsequent downfall in August 1953 changed the course of Iranian history, and remains a haunting memory for the people of Iran today. The British and American governments collaborated in a plot to remove Mosaddeq but which nonetheless failed to ignite. However, days afterwards, amid violent street disturbances, Mosaddeq's government did indeed fall. So, for half a century the conventional wisdom attributed the events of 19th August 1953 to foul play by the CIA and a myth of CIA power and success was created that has mesmerized opinion ever since and cast a shadow over Iran's continuingly troubled relations with America. This pathbreaking study unearths new documentary evidence to suggest the truth lies elsewhere and that Mosaddeq's fall actually took Washington and London by complete surprise. The author provides compelling evidence to suggest that the toppling of Mosaddeq was rooted primarily in internal Iranian dynamics and that prominent clerics of the time, notably the grand Shiite Marja of the time, Ayatollah Boroujerdi, played a crucial role.
Introduction How the story evolved How did a myth about the CIA role develop and prevail? Why did the CIA files remain unclassified? 1 THE CONTEXT Foreign influence as a prime mover in Iranian politics The Tudeh Party The Azerbaijan Crisis, 1945–46 Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi The Ulama as a socio-political force Ayatollah Seyyed Abol'qassem Kashani: the precursor of clerical activism Razmara: prelude to the oil nationalization crisis 2 THE ADVENT OF MOSADDEQ AND THE OIL CRISIS The rise of the National Front The nomination of Mosaddeq Doctor Mohammad Mosaddeq: a sketch The initial British reaction to oil nationalization The early American attitude to the oil dispute Political line-ups in Tehran Early conduct of the oil dispute The British complaint to the Security Council The Washington oil talks The World Bank proposal Early forebodings 3 MOSADDEQ'S SECOND GOVERNMENT, JULY 1952 TO AUGUST 1953 The Qavam hiatus and the Siy'e Tyr popular uprising (21 July 1952) Rift among Mosaddeq supporters A wedge to break the oil log-jam: the Truman-Churchill joint offer Mosaddeq's reforms and the theory of legitimacy The British two-pronged strategy: subversion and engagement The covert track The engagement track Diplomatic relations with Britain are broken off Final attempts to resolve the oil dispute A day forgotten in the Iranian collective memory 4 THE DOWNSLIDE The clash at the helm; the February 1953 jumble The Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi: a retrospective sketch General Fazlollah Zahedi Internal conspiracies The abduction of the police chief The link-up: TPAJAX and the internal cabal The summer of all dangers The taming of the Shah The failure of the TPAJAX coup 5 THE DOWNFALL The gathering storm, 16–18 August 1953 The backlash: events leading to the fall of Mosaddeq on 19 August Monitoring by the US Embassy The final hours The military factor in the fall of Mosaddeq TPAJAX military planning and the role of Iranian officers 6 THE ANATOMY OF 19 AUGUST CIA station activism inTehran, 16–19 August The role of Iranian agents Surprise in Washington Ambassador Henderson's last meeting with Mosaddeq The CIA money An orphan British secret document Analysis of the British secret document A coup d'état, a popular uprising or something else? 7 WHERE DID THE SPARK COME FROM? The missing link: the Boroujerdi factor 8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Power structure and internal dynamics in the early 1950s Mosaddeq's rule The handling of the oil crisis and stalemate External and internal conspiracies The TPAJAX coup and its aftermath The involvement of ulama The causes of Mosaddeq's defeat Notes Direct Sources of the Study Index
DARIOUSH BAYANDOR is currently an Iran analyst and historian living in Switzerland. Born Iranian, the author held diplomatic posts in New York and Tehran and was a lecturer on international law, diplomacy and international institutions in Tehran University, the National University of Tehran as well as in the diplomatic school of the foreign ministry prior to the Islamic Revolution. He joined the United Nations in 1980 where he notably headed several UN humanitarian offices in different continents, stretching over a twenty-year period.
'The author has tackled a subject of great importance, infused with emotions and obscured by political manipulation, objectively and with care, using all available sources and to put the events in their proper context. The book deserves a wide audience and should do much to bring this episode into proper perspective. In short, a first-rate scholarly contribution which has implications for contemporary politics.'- Shahram Chubin, Director of Studies, Geneva Centre for Security Policy 'This is an important and beautifully balanced study of the overthrow of Iran's Prime Minister Mosaddeq. For over fifty years the literature has concentrated on the role of CIA and British intelligence. The author has now revealed the critical participation of important Iranian individuals and political factions.'- Charles Naas, former Director, US-Iranian Affairs at the State Department, Washington and Minister-Chargé d' Affaires in Tehran 1977-79 'It is helpful to be reminded that history often needs re-examining.' - The Economist 'This is an interesting and provocative book.' - Hugh Arbuthnott, Asian Affairs
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