A team of leading experts investigate a range of philosophical issues to do with the self and self-knowledge. Self and Self-Knowledge focuses on two main problems: how to account for I-thoughts and the consequences that doing so would have for our notion of the self; and how to explain subjects' ability to know the kind of psychological states they enjoy, which characteristically issues in psychological self-ascriptions.The first section of the
volume consists of essays that, by appealing to different considerations which range from the normative to the phenomenological, offer an assessment of the animalist conception of the self. The second section
presents an examination as well as a defence of the new epistemic paradigm, largely associated with recent work by Christopher Peacocke, according to which knowledge of our own mental states and actions should be based on an awareness of them and of our attempts to bring them about. The last section explores a range of different perspectives--from neo-expressivism to constitutivism--in order to assess the view that self-knowledge is more robust than any other form of knowledge. While the
contributors differ in their specific philosophical positions, they all share the view that careful philosophical analysis is needed before scientific research can be fruitfully brought to bear on the issues
at hand. These thought-provoking essays provide such an analysis and greatly deepen our understanding of these central aspects of our mentality.
A team of leading experts investigate a range of philosophical issues to do with the self and self-knowledge. Self and Self-Knowledge focuses on two main problems: how to account for I-thoughts and the consequences that doing so would have for our notion of the self; and how to explain subjects' ability to know the kind of psychological states they enjoy, which characteristically issues in psychological self-ascriptions.The first section of the
volume consists of essays that, by appealing to different considerations which range from the normative to the phenomenological, offer an assessment of the animalist conception of the self. The second section
presents an examination as well as a defence of the new epistemic paradigm, largely associated with recent work by Christopher Peacocke, according to which knowledge of our own mental states and actions should be based on an awareness of them and of our attempts to bring them about. The last section explores a range of different perspectives--from neo-expressivism to constitutivism--in order to assess the view that self-knowledge is more robust than any other form of knowledge. While the
contributors differ in their specific philosophical positions, they all share the view that careful philosophical analysis is needed before scientific research can be fruitfully brought to bear on the issues
at hand. These thought-provoking essays provide such an analysis and greatly deepen our understanding of these central aspects of our mentality.
List of contributors
Annalisa Coliva: Introduction
Part one: The self and its individuation
1: Carol Rovane: Does rationality enforce identity?
2: Martine Nida-Rümelin: The conceptual origin of subject body
dualism
3: Christopher Peacocke: Subjects and consciousness
4: John Campbell: Does perception do any work in an understanding
of the first person?
Part two: Consciousness, action awareness and their role in
self-knowledge
5: Jane Heal: Consciousness and self-awareness
6: Conor McHugh: Reasons and self-knowledge
7: Lucy O'Brien: Knowledge of actions and tryings
8: Christopher Peacocke: Conscious Events and Self-Ascriptions:
Comments on Heal and O'Brien
Part three: Self-knowledge. Robust or fragile?
9: Dorit Bar-On: Externalism and skepticism: recognition,
expression and self-knowledge
10: Annalisa Coliva: One variety of self-knowledge: constitutivism
as constructivism
11: Paul Snowdon: How to think about phenomenal self-knowledge
12: Akeel Bilgrami: The unique status of self-knowledge
Annalisa Coliva is Associate Professor at the University of Modena
and Reggio Emilia (Italy), and Associate Director of the research
centre COGITO. After receiving a BA in Philosophy from the
University of Bologna, she obtained a MLitt and a PhD from St
Andrews, as well as a PhD from Vercelli. She has been Fulbright and
Alexander von Humboldt Fellow at Columbia and Heidelberg
respectively, as well as Fellow of the Italian Academy at Columbia
University in the city
of New York. She has authored seven books, edited four, and
published several articles in international journals.
the book gives a good idea of what analytic philosophy is like
these days. There are lots of carefully-defined views, and
disagreements keep on emerging; sometimes in ways, and for reasons,
that one would not expect. . . The reader who is already immersed
in the topic will recognize many of the views, and will spot new
moves in the debate. The reader who is new to the field will have
to work hard to map out the different views and the common themes,
but that itself will be a most rewarding mental exercise.
*Philosophy Now*
This is a stimulating collection of essays on the nature of people
and the various ways in which we represent ourselves.
*Aaron Zimmerman, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*
the book gives a good idea of what analytical philosophy is like
these days. There are lots of carefully-defined views, and
disagreements keep on emerging. ... The reader who is already
immersed in the topic will recognise many of the views, and will
spot new moves in the debate. The reader who is new to the field
will have to work hard to map out the different views and the
common themes, but that itself will be a most rewarding mental
exercise.
*Richard Baron, Philosophy Now*
The book will likely be of greatest interest to Peacocke fans since
it not only includes his essay 'Subjects and Consciousness' but
also includes three articles criticizing and interpreting his
earlier work followed by a replyIn all, this volume offers a nice
range of papers on self-knowledge, and I'd recommend it to
specialists working in the area.
*Analysis*
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