Table of Contents

Part 1 Static games of complete information: games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium; iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium. Part 2 Dynamic games of complete information: extensive-form games; applications of multi-stage games with observed actions; repeated games. Part 3 Static games of incomplete information: Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium; Bayesian games and mechanism design. Part 4 Dynamic games of incomplete information: equilibrium refinements - perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection; reputation effects; sequential bargaining under incomplete information. Part 5 Advanced topics: more equilibrium refinements - stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance; advanced topics in strategic-form games; payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium; common knowledge and games.

Promotional Information

Game Theory by Fudenberg and Tirole provides a comprehensive and precise exposition of the theory and the main applied topics, plus challenging exercises conveying the key ideas from a wide literature. The treatments of dynamics and incomplete information unify developments of the 1980s. This book will be a standard text and reference. -- Robert Wilson, Professor, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Both broad and deep, this book belongs on the shelf of every serious student of game theory. -- David Kreps, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Game Theory is the book to read if you want to be published in Econometrica. -- Ken Binmore, Professor of Economics, University of Michigan and University College London Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be. -- Charles Wilson, Professor of Economics, New York University

About the Author

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.

Reviews

"Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be." Charles Wilson , Professor of Economics, New York University